Although the Medicaid program is partially controlled by the federal government, there is considerable latitude in the ability of states to set eligibility requirements and the types of OLS results support the prediction that Medicaid expenditures reduce labor supply, but controlling for state fixed or random effects alters the effect of both the AFDC and Medicaid programs on both the decision to participate as well as the number of hours worked of female heads of households. We also consider the effects of policy endogeneity on these estimates using instruments for state welfare generosity and find evidence that estimates of the effect of welfare on labor supply are sensitive to the failure to control for time-varying policy endogeneity.
I. Introduction
The issue of the design and effects of government policies aimed at providing support for children is at the center of an ongoing national debate. Social scientists, policy makers, and the public at large have all focused their attention on the benefits and, perhaps even more so, the costs to society of this support network. These costs are perceived to take not just monetary forms but also to have adverse incentive effects in terms of work, out of wedlock births, divorce, etc.
Much of this debate has focused on the adverse effects of the cash components of welfare Recently, economists and other social scientists have used the cross-state variation in these programs as a form of "natural experiment" that allows them to access the effectiveness and adverse incentive effects of these programs. In this paper we use this approach to add to the literature on the effects of these programs on labor supply. First, we construct three new measures of the value of Medicaid benefits to adults, children, and families which vaiy across states and time. These alternate measure will allows us to test for the sensitivity of the conclusions from previous studies to the measure of Medicaid value used. Previous work on Medicaid and female labor supply has used measures of state level Medicaid spending which included spending on the elderly and disabled. Since these group accounts for a substantial share of all Medicaid expenditures, and they are not randomly distributed across states, this has the potential to bias the reported results. Second, because there is substantial variation across states in their labor market characteristics, demographic mixes, and other factors which are potentially correlated with both labor supply and benefit generosity, our analysis checks for the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of state fixed and random effects. Estimates which control for these state specific factors yield substantially different implications for the impact of welfareor Medicaid on the work decision of women. Finally, given the evidence that cross-state variations in program design are not uncorrelated with labor market observables, we employ the instrumental variables technique developed in Besley and Case (1994) to control for potential policy endogeneity. The paper is organized as follows: Section II contains some institutional 2 background on Medicaid. Section III is a review of previous work in this area. In Section IV we discuss the theoretical and empirical models. The data used in this paper and the results of our estimation are discussed in Section V. In Section VI conclusions and implications are drawn.
II. Institutional Background on Medicaid
Medicaid, enacted in 1965, was intended to provide health care insurance to low income to 100% of the FPL will be eligible by the year 2002. It also allowed states the option to provide coverage for pregnant women if their household income was up to 185% of the FPL. By 1993, 34 states had availed themselves of this option and 25 of them had increased coverage up to the 3 maximum 185% of the FPL. Although the 1990 expansion only covered these women for pregnancy services, the net effect of these changes has been to expand the potential pool of families whose labor supply might be affected by Medicaid.
III. Previous Research
Studies on the effects of government transfer programs designed to provide assistance to low-income women and children are not new. There has been a voluminous literature on the incentive effects of AFDC and Food Stamps. Moffitt (1991) provides a detailed discussion of the effects on labor supply, female headship, and program participation. Most of these studies seem to find some adverse affect of program participation on female labor supply.
Recently, Blank (1989) , Winkler (1991) , Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) , and Yelowitz (1995) have extended this literature to examine the impact of the Medicaid program on labor supply.
Although Blank (1989) , Winkler (1991) , and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) all find a negative effect on labor force participation, the size of the effect varies substantially across the studies. Further, Winkler and Blank fail to find any significant effect on welfare participation of changes in Medicaid generosity, while Moflitt and Wolfe find a significant effect. Yelowitz (1995) actually finds that relaxing the eligibility criterion increases labor supply. These differences may in part reflect differences in the measures of Medicaid used in each study. Because Medicaid is an inkind benefit, the proper valuation for a family is problematic and the choice of appropriate specification or measure is not straight forward.
Winjcjer (1991) used state level Medicaid expenditures per recipient in her study. This measure does not allow for any individual heterogeneity in the valuation of the Medicaid 4 insurance variable. Further, because she has only a single cross section she can not control for state specific effects that may be correlated with both the generosity of benefit and labor supply. Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) use a family specific health index to construct a measure of potential utilization of Medicaid coverage. The condition of an individual's health identifies the effects of Medicaid through the fact that those in poor health will place a higher value of Medicaid provided health service.5 However, as Yelowitz (1995) notes, the coefficient on this variable may also capture two other effects of poor heath. First, poor health lowers the worker's marginal product and hence the wage an AFDC recipient could earn, potentially reducing labor supply.6
Secondly, those in poor health will have a greater marginal disutility of work, or steeper indifference curves, again potentially reducing labor supply. Thus, the coefficient on this proxy could be capturing more than the direct effect of Medicaid. Finally, since Moffitt and Wolfe cannot identify state of residence in their data, they are not able to control for state-specific factors influencing benefits and labor supply.7 Yelowitz (1995) uses changes in state qualifying income requirements for families with young chilthen following the legislative changes in the COBRAs of the 1980's and the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988. Since states vary in their income eligibility thresholds, and in the timing of these eligibility changes, these rule changes provide a potentially exogenous source of variation in these programs within and across states. While this variable will capture the effect of variation in Medicaid on the extensive (eligibility) margin, it does not capture the effects of variation on the intensive (generosity or spending) margin. This distinction is theoretically important as the effect on labor supply of an expansion in benefit eligibility should lead to an increase in participation ( although the effect on hours is ambiguous), while the latter would lead 5 to a reduction in participation. Thus, the margin over which the effects of Medicaid operate in the Yelowitz (1993) is fundamentally different from the margin examined here or in the papers by Moffitt and Wolfe (1994) and Wink.ler (1991 ) .8 It should be noted that spending measures like those used in Winkler (1991) will capture increases in both the number of eligible recipients (take up rate) and in the generosity of this program. The total impact of this program on labor supply depends on induced variations on both margins. Further, since these changes in eligibility standards applied only to households with very young children or infants, they may not be highly correlated with cross-state and individual differences in the valuation of nonmaternity benefits which would affect the behavior of the majority of Medicaid recipients.9
IV. Theoretical and Empirical Model Moffitt (1983) , Blank (1989) , Winkler (1991) , and Yelowitz (1993) contain detailed discussions of the effects of welfare and Medicaid on the family budget constraint and labor supply. Following Moffitt (1983) , let the utility function take the form U(H, Y, P) where H is hours, Y is disposable income, and P is an indicator of welfare participation. In the presence of welfare stigma effects, utility is increasing in income but decreasing in hours worked and participation. The budget constraint takes the form:
where W is net or after tax wages, N is nonlabor income, is the AFDC implicit programmatic tax rate on earnings, and 0 is the sum of the value of AFDC and Medicaid benefits. Since
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Medicaid is an in-kind benefit, this value should be the insurance value of the Medicaid expenditures rather than the cash value of the benefit. The labor supply function for the family that maximizes utility will be:
We estimate a reduced form variant of this model where we consider labor supply on both the intensive and extensive margins. The decision to work can be expressed as follows:
LFP, = X,, + BEN, ÷ Med + The probability that a woman will work can be written as:
where 'I is the cumulative normal density fimction. Equation (4) was estimated as a probit model.
The second aspect of labor supply is the determination of the intensive variation or the number of hours worked. To estimate this model we follow Heckman (1980) and estimate a two-step model. The first stage equation uses the probit estimates of equation (4) to construct a sample selection correction, the inverse of the Mills ratio, A, which is then added to the hours equation:
where is annual hours worked for those that H1,> 0 and the error term, u is normally distiibuted with zero mean and unit variance. As there are unlikely to be any variables affecting labor supply on the intensive margin that do not affect it on the extensive margin, our second stage equation is identified by the nonlinearity of the functional form.'°V . Data
The models in equations (3) and (4) were estimated using individual data drawn from the 1988-1993 March Supplement files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). In order to make the study comparable to earlier work, the sample was restricted to single females between the 8 ages of 18 and 65 years old with at least one child under age 15. For the purposes of this study single-females were defined as those who were divorced, separated, or never married. The data set contained 21 ,229 observations. The state level AFDC and Medicaid data were drawn from various issues of the House Ways and Means Committee Green Book. The data set included forty-nine states and the District of Columbia)' All dollar values were deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Because previous research suggests that estimates may be sensitive to the choice of Summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table I .
About 68 percent of the female household heads in our sample work, and the average work week is almost 26 hours. About a third of the sample is on AFDC and the mean monthly benefit for recipients over this period was $262. The mean monthly value of state Medicaid expenditures per recipient (PRMCAID) was $92, while the mean value of family Medicaid benefits (Medfam) is $126. This suggests that on a cash expenditure basis, Medicaid health insurance for the average welfare family has a value of almost 50 percent of the value of the cash benefits received from the program. Clearly, this program represents a potentially important source of noncash income for recipients.
In Table 2 we present the results of estimating the probit employment (columns 1-4) and hours equations (columns 5-8) from equations (3) and (4), respectively using the different Medicaid variables discussed above. The estimated hours and employment equations yield results similar to those found in other studies with regards to the effects of our demographic variables. We find consistent evidence that higher AFDC spending reduces both employment and hours. Further, living in a state with a Medically Needy program (MN) reduces the likelihood of participating in the labor force and the average hours worked per week.
As found in Winkler (1991) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) , Medicaid expenditures (PRMCAID) have a negative and significant effect on employment. Our results differ from Winkler, however, in that we also find a significant effect on hours. These results are remarkably robust to alternate constructs of the Medicaid variable. The economic significance of these variables can be seen in Table 3 where we calculate the marginal effects and elasticities for eachof the Medicaid and AFDC variables. The economic importance of the AFDC and Medicaid variables seems roughly constant across the specifications. The magnitudes are such that a $26 increase in monthly AFDC benefits (about 10 percent) would reduce the labor force participation rate by about .6 percentage points (about I percent). This estimate is at the low end of the range of estimates of the impact of such a change in AFDC benefits found in Winkler (1990) , where a 10 percent increase in AFDC reduced labor force participation between .8 and 1.5 percentage points. The effect of a 10 percent increase in monthly Medicaid spending would be to reduce labor force participation by about .36 percentage points. Thus, despite having a statistically significant effect, these results do n.ot suggest that the magnitude of the impact of these welfare programs on labor force participation is large. We also find evidence that the estimated elasticities for hours are quite small. A 10 percent increase in monthly AFDC benefits or Medicaid expenditures would reduce hours worked by between .11 and .25 percent (between .04
and .10 hours per week). Thus, these pooled cross section results suggest a small but significant effect of both parts of the welfare program on both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply.
Since work by Moffitt and others suggest that welfare effects on household formation differ for blacks (is larger), we also interacted these welfare measures with our racial indicator to see if there were differential labor supply effects.'3 Although controlling for observables black women tend to work less than whites, the adverse effects of AFDC and Medicaid on labor supply is limited to whites. While AFDC, and each of the Medicaid variables, are negative and significant for whites, the black interaction terms were strongly positive, significant, and large enough in magnitude to suggest that these programs have no adverse effect on labor supply. If anything these results suggest that Medicaid enhances labor force participation and hours worked for black women.'4
The estimation approach used in these estimates exploits the cross-state variation in programmatic design to identi' the effects on labor supply. As discussed in Moffitt (1994) and Hoynes (1995) , states may differ in social or cultural norms or other unobserved factors which could be correlated with the level of their welfare benefits.'5 If these unobserved differences across states are correlated with both program generosity and labor supply, OLS estimates could be biased. If states that are wealthier have both more generous welfare benefits and lower labor supply, then our results might show a spurious inverse correlation between labor supply and benefits. The failure to control for unobserved state effects may significantly bias the estimated impact of state welfare programmatic variables on behavior. Moffitt (1994) and Hoynes (1995) found that including controls for state effects in a model of female headship reversed the positive effect of welfare found in OLS estimates.
Given this, we modeled this heterogeneity two ways to reflect the presence of either unobserved state random or fixed effects. In the random effects case, the estimated probit or OLS coefficients would be consistent, but inefficient as the standard errors on the group or state level variables will be too small. Ainemiya (1978) and Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994) developed conceptually similar two-step estimators for random effects models for the OLS and probit specifications.
The first stage involves regressing the individual variables and a set of state specific intercepts on labor force participation or hours. In the second stage generalized least squares is used to regress the state specific intercepts on the state specific variables. These results from estimating our models using this two step process for employment (columns 1-4) and hours (columns 5-8) are reported in Table 4 . Since the second stage errors may be non-spherical (heteroskedastic), we report White-corrected standard errors for the second stage model.
In the random effects specification, the welfare programmatic variables appear to have 12 somewhat different impacts on the intensive and extensive margins. While AFDC and Food Stamps have an adverse (and significantly) affect on hours, they do not appear to be significantly related to labor force participation. Interestingly, the presence of a Medically Needy program now has a positive effect on both labor force participation and hours where the reverse was true in the OLS. There is no evidence that Medicaid expenditures adversely affect hours worked in these random effect specifications. Further, in only two of the four specifications do we find evidence that Medicaid adversely affects participation. The magnitude of point estimates of the effects of Medicaid on labor force participation are less than half those found in OLS estimates.
If state effects are fixed rather than random, then the error terms in our participation and hours models would be: e, =d, + To test for time invariant factors that differ across states, we re-estimated our models including state fixed effects. These results are reported in Table 5 for employment (columns 2-5) and hours (columns 6-9). We can not reject the hypothesis that the state fixed effects matter in our model. For instance, the Chi-squared statistics for the inclusion of the state fixed effects in models 1 and 4 were 424.06 and 435.74, respectively, in the labor force participation equation. In models I and 4 for the hours equations the F-statistics were 2.96 and 3.01 respectively)6 13 Further, Hausman tests for each of our Medicaid models reject the random effects specification in favor of the fixed effects.'7
When fixed effects were included in the hours equations, the coefficient on the Food Stamps policy variable reverses sign. Strikingly, once we control for state effects, the AJ7DC measure is no longer significant in the either the employment or hours equation, and its sign is actually reversed in many of the employment equations. The point estimates and elasticities (Table 3 ) of the impact of AFDC on hours are reduced by 19-42 percent in the fixed effect specifications. This result suggests that state specific variation in unobserved factors which determine labor supply variation account for a substantial part of the previously estimated effect of AFDC on labor supply. Previous estimates that failed to incorporate this cross-state heterogeneity would seriously overestimate the disincentive effects of welfare and Medicaid on labor supply.
The estimates for the Medicaid variables now prove generally insignificant in the hours specifications, and in one case even switches sign. Similarly, once we control for state fixed effects, all the measures of Medicaid tend to lose their significance in the employment regressions. As seen in Table 3 , the magnitude of the elasticities and marginal effects estimates in the hours and participation equations are consistently reduced and in many cases go from negative to positive. As with the AFDC variables, these results suggest that a significant amount of the previously estimated impact of welfare programs on labor supply is due to time invariant unobserved state effects.'8
Finally, we explore a potential explanation for the source of the unobserved state effects. Besley and Case (1994) suggest that the inclusion of state effects may not remove unobserved 14 heterogeneity bias from models using cross-state variation in polices to identify individual policy treatment effects. Moffitt (1994) suggests that the state level effects may reflect policy endogeneity arising from the political process when state program generosity reflects state economic performance. As Besley and Case (1994) suggest, failure to control for these time varying unobserved state specific factors may lead to bias in the type of cross-state "natural" experiment that we are attempting.
If policy endogeneity is a major concern, then the various measures of welfare generosity (AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamps) will be correlated with the error in the labor supply equation. The potential endogeneity of welfare benefits, Ben, , can be expressed as a function of the variables that determine labor supply, a set of other exogenous variables that are orthogonal to the error in the labor supply equations, Z, and an error term E2jor:
Given the consistency in the direction of the effects of the individual components of welfare, and since the policy endogeneity with respect to each of the components of welfare is likely to have a common source, we follow Moffitt (1994) in aggregating the welfare measures into a composite dollar equivalent expenditures. The set of instruments, Z,1, that we use are three political variables that Besley and Case (1994) found to be exogenous in estimates of the effect of state specific disability programs on employment and earnings (percent of Democrats in the State House and Senate and whether the governor is a Democrat).
To insure that the qualitative nature of our previous results are not influenced by the aggregation of the three components of welfare into a composite, we first re-estimated our single equation models with and without fixed effects using the aggregate welfare constructs)9 Those results are presented in Table 6 . As can clearly be seen, all the welfare aggregates have a negative and statistically significant correlation with labor force participation and hours worked.
Similarly, the addition of the state fixed effects dramatically reduces the estimated coefficients on the welfare variables, and we can not reject the null hypothesis that they affect both of our labor supply measures. Thus, the qualitative nature of our previous results are not sensitive to the use of an aggregate welfare measure.
In Table 7 we present the results of our instrumental variable estimation of the effects of welfare on labor supply. Given the discrete nature of the labor force participation variable, the instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the employment equation involves the estimation of the simultaneous log likelihood function for each woman where the likelihood function represents both the single equation probit model for participation and the linear least squares model of benefit generosity under the assumption that the errors in these two equations each are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance E •20 As in the single equation models, the inclusion of fixed effects dramatically reduces the size and significance of the coefficients on the impact of the welfare variable on labor supply.
While the effect of controlling for fixed unobserved state heterogeneity appears to reduce the estimated impact of the program variable, controlling for policy endogeneity appears to increase the estimate impact. The coefficients on the welfare measures in the IV employment equations (Table 7 column 2) with fixed effects are over 10 times bigger than the single equation results with fixed effects. Interestingly, the IV models with fixed effect yield parameter estimates only slightly smaller than the single equation models with no controls for state heterogeneity. While 16 these coefficents are still not precisely estimated, they may suggest that magnitude of the bias in the single equation models that do not control for state heterogeneity is not as great as the fixed effects estimates would imply.
The effect of instrumenting for state heterogeneity appears to be even stronger in the hours equations. In contrast to the single equation results, we flhd that welfare still has a statistically significant adverse effect on hours in the fixed effect specification and that the fixed effects IV coefficients are even larger than the single equation estimates with no fixed effects.
These results are supportive of the presence of policy endogeneity in the determination of state welfare benefits. These results suggest that unobserved political factors which generate more Democrats in state government tend to occur in states where employment is lower and welfare benefits are more generous. Of course, the increase in the magnitude of the IV coefficients is also consistent with the presence of measurement error (attenuation) bias in the welfare measures. Recall that the welfare measure should include Medicaid valuations for the individual (the insurance value) rather than the cash value measures used here. Thus, it seems plausible that measurement error causes an underestimate of the effect of these programs on labor supply.
To strengthen our confidence the IV results, we undertook two addition tests. First, Bound et a! (1994) have shown that IV estimates may yield even more inconsistent estimates that OLS estimation if the correlation between the instrument and endogenous variable is weak. The results from estimating the first stage equation (8) with fixed state effects are presented in Table   8 . They clearly indicate that the instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous welfare variable. The t-statistics for each of the instruments are quite large and indicate significance at the 5 percent level or better in all of the models, even the fixed effect ones. Secondly, since we have three instruments for our welfare measure we were able to performs tests of overidentifing restriction or that the political variables (instruments) do not belong in the labor supply equation.
The results of the overidentification tests for the models with fixed effects are presented in Table   9 .' In only one of the 8 estimated models do we fail to reject the hypothesis that these political variable have an independent effect on the labor supply behavior of single women. Taken as a whole these IV results suggest that the failure to control unobserved state policy endogeneity again leads to biased estimates. Our evidence suggests that fixed effect models will lead to underestimates of the effect of welfare on labor supply.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we examine the effects of various elements of the government support network on labor supply. We exploit cross-state variation in the structure of these programs and control for state random and fixed effects that may have biased previous cross section estimates using state level benefit measures. Given the recent growth in both Medicaid spending and eligibility, we focus primarily on the Medicaid program.
Estimates of the effects of the Medicaid and other welfare programmatic variables were sensitive to the treatment of area or state effects. In molels without controls for these effect, we found that all of the welfare variables had strong negative effects on employment, and, to a lesser degree, hours. The adverse effect of welfare on labor supply seems limited to whites in these models, despite the higher participation rate of blacks in these programs. In models with state fixed or random effects these variables were consistently found to have weaker or no significant adverse effect on employment and hours.
The role of policy endogeneity is explored through the uses of state level political 18 variables as instruments for the welfare variables. These variables were found to be strongly correlated with within and across state variations in benefit levels, and to be orthogonal to the unobserved component of state welfare benefit generosity which is correlated with labor supply.
The fact that the IV estimates are actually larger in the employment and fixed effect hours models is suggestive of the fact it is important to control for both unobserved fixed and time varying state specific effects when modeling the impact of these welfare programs on labor 4. The Medically Needy income level can be set up to 133 percent of the AFDC maximum. It should be noted that seven (7) states actually set the threshold lower than the AFDC threshold.
5. In a paper on the effects of welfare on headship, Moffitt (1994) uses the sum of state expenditures per recipient on Medicaid, AFDC, and Food Stamps in a state as his measure of these programs.
6. Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) do include the actual wage net of estimated taxes for employed workers and a measure of the expected net wage for nonparticipants in their regression. The inclusion of these wage measures cuts their estimate of the adverse labor supply effect of Medicaid in half. It should be noted, however, that these wage measures do not fully control for this bias because poor health reduces the actual wage received below its t,otential, unobserved, value.
Workers with identical observed wages, but differing in health status, may still have different labor supply behaviors because of differences in the size of this unobserved component. This unobserved gap will be positively correlated with the Medicaid valuation variable, but negatively correlated with labor supply, yielding an overestimate of the effect of Medicaid. For the nonparticipants, the expected net wage used in the Moffitt and Wolfe regression is estimated without controlling for the fact that this expected wage will vary with health status and hence be correlated with their Medicaid variable and labor supply.
,. It should be noted that Yelowitz (1995) also contains controls for state fixed effects.
8. Blank (1989) also looks at the effects of expanded eligibility through the creation of the Medically Needy program.
9. It should of course be noted that the converse holds true for our analysis. By ignoring cross state variation in the timing of changes in these eligibility criterion, we overlook changes in the expected value of Medid benefits that may be relevant for the labor supply decisions of pregnant women and those withsmajl infants. These would be captured in our variables to some degree if they affect 22 average expenditures across states.
10. As a check on the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we tried two alternate exclusion restrictions to gain identification. First, we followed Winkler (1991) and omitted kids under 6 from the second stage equation. Alternatively, we omitted the dummy variable for separated from the second stage equation. In both case we got results that are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 4 . Because there seems to be no good theoretical rationale for these exclusion restricts we report the results without them. The alternate results are available from the authors upon request.
ii. Arizona was excluded because it operates Medicaid as a demonstration project.
12. We also experimented with a family specific Medicaid measure that reflected the actual number of children in the household. The scaled variable was chosen to avoid potential endogeneity issues between household size and welfare benefits. It should be noted, however, that the qualitative nature of the results were not sensitive to the use of scaled as opposed to actual family size.
13. These results are available from the authors upon request.
14. It should be noted that these conclusions about the interaction of race and the Medjcajd variables are not sensitive to the inclusion of the state fixed effects.
is. Given the fact that we only have pooled cross section data we are not able to examine bias introduced by unobserved individual effects that may be correlated with the policy variables. If selective migration induces a common taste for benefits and work then these individual effects could be correlated with the state and welfare effects. Hoynes (1995) presents evidence, however, that shows that controlling for state effects is sufficient to capture population heterogeneity across states.
16. The likelihood ratio test had a critical value of 67.22 in the Chi-square test at the 95 percent level and the F-test had a critical value of 1.34 at the 95 percent level.
17.The tests statistic for the specification using PRMCAID was 14.54 while it was 12.96 in the specification using Medfam which is well above the critical values for the Chi-squared test with 3 df.
18. Although our results are similar to Moffitt (1994) using CPS data over the period 1968-89, a concern might be that in the panel our results simply reflect the absence of sufficient within state variation in these benefits to generate statistically significant effects. As a crude check on this we regresses our welfare and Medicaid variables on state fixed effects to see how much of the variation in these variables would remain. The state effects explained between 57 and 77 percent of the variation in these measures suggesting that while cross state variation is an important component there is subst.antjal variance in these measures lefl.
19. The results from using these aggregate measures and including Heckman corrections in the hours equations are also qualitatively similar to the disaggregated results. These results are available from the authors upon request. 20. See Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) (1.97)" (.98) NOTES: 'SIGNIFICANT AT 10 PERCENT LEVEL "SIGNIFICANT AT 5 PERCENT LEVEL
